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Casenotes
JURIES - CHALLENGING JURY PANEL FoR BIAs-
State v. Eggers (Neb. 1963).
Appellant was tried before a jury on March 5th and 6th of
1962 for issuing an insufficient fund check and was found not
guilty. On March 6, 1962, another information was filed charging
him with having issued a different insufficient fund check.1 His
attorney, realizing that Eggers would be tried for the second
offense by jurors drawn from the same jury panel from which the
jury at his first trial had been drawn, filed a motion to quash the
complaint and information and to abate the prosecution. Later,
appellant obtained new counsel who filed a motion for a continuance
premised upon three grounds, one of which was that the jury panel
before which the case would be heard would be biased because
of their knowledge of the previous case. The motion to quash and
abate was overruled, as was the motion for a continuance, and a
jury was selected from the same group of jurors who seven weeks
before had constituted the jury panel for appelant's prior trial.2
On appeal Eggers assigned as error: (1) that the trial court
had compelled him to be tried before a jury selected from the same
panel which had previously tried him upon a similar charge; and
(2) that three of the jurors who sat at the second trial had, in fact,
also served upon the jury that tried him on the previous charge.3
A question of first impression in Nebraska-whether it is pre-
judicial error to compel an accused to be tried by a jury selected
from a panel from which an earlier jury had been selected and had
heard a similar charge against the same accused-was squarely
before the Nebraska Supreme Court. The Nebraska court, however,
'LState v. Eggers, 175 Neb. 79, 120 N.W.2d 541 (1963). As nearly as can
be determined from the report, the two offenses charged arose out of
entirely separate transactions and were completely unrelated.
2 Specifically, three of the jurors who sat at the second trial of defendant
had served on the jury at defendant's first trial. From the questions
and answers at the voir dire examination of the jury panel, it appears
that all but two members of the panel knew that the accused at the
former trial was also the defendant in the present case, and several,
although not selected to sit upon the jury at the first trial, had remained
in the courtroom after the impanelling was completed and heard at
least a part of the state's case.
3 Brief for Plaintiff in Error, p. 4, State v. Eggers, 175 Neb. 79, 120 N.W.2d
541 (1963).
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did not decide the issue. The case was decided on the narrow pro-
cedural point that the challenge had not been properly raised. After
demonstrating that the motion to quash and abate was inappropriate
to challenge the jury panel, and concerning itself with the motion
for a continuance, the court stated: 4
In Seaton v. State. . . we held: 'The question of the competency of
a venireman to sit in the trial of a criminal case cannot be raised
by a motion for a continuance.'
In the instant case, the defendant was represented by counsel
who knew the proper method of raising the question of disqualifica-
tions of jurors. For his own reasons he elected not to do so and
passed the jurors selected for cause. By passing the jurors for cause,
the defendant waived any objection to their selection as jurors.
The court had come close to facing this problem of jurors' knowl-
edge of prior proceedings in two earlier cases involving defendants
who were tried separately for criminal acts arising out of the same
transaction. Some of the same jurors sat at the trials of both de-
fendants,5 and it was held that the "double duty" jurors were not
qualified to sit at both trials.
I.
THE PROBLEM
Eggers presents a serious problem to Nebraska defense at-
torneys faced with a jury panel, a large part of which may well
be biased against the defendant. The case denies an attorney any
method of challenging the jury panel as a whole and forces him to
challenge each prospective juror individually for cause-a process
which may deny the accused his right to a fair and impartial jury.,
The proper method of raising the question of whether the jury
panel was biased, the court stated, was to challenge each of the
prospective jurors for cause when the jury was impaneled. This
method, however, would have placed counsel for Eggers in a dif-
4State v. Eggers, 175 Neb. 79, 85, 120 N.W.2d 541, 546 (1963). See Seaton
v. State, 106 Neb. 833, 184 N.W.890 (1956).
5 Bufford v. State, 148 Neb. 38, 26 N.W.2d 383 (1947) and Seaton v. State,
106 Neb. 833, 184 N.W. 890 (1921).
6 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committeed ...." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have . . .a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11
(1875).
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ficult position. In order to challenge the three jurors who had
served at the previous trial, it might have been sufficient to assert
that they had so served. On the other hand, bearing in mind the
prior rulings of the trial judge on the jury issue, there is the dis-
tinct possibility that more extensive questioning might have been
required. It might have proven necessary to question the jurors at
length about the prior trial and the effect the earlier trial had
upon their ability to hear the case impartially in order to establish
a firm basis for a challenge for cause. Certainly questions involving
the former trial would have been necessary in connection with the
challenges to the other jurors on the panel who had not sat at the
former trial but who knew about it in varying degrees. As Eggers'
counsel agrued on appeal,7 any discussion of the prior trial along
with the fact that the defendant had formerly been accused of a
similar offense would have been highly prejudicial to defendant.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has said: 8 "'The general rule is
that evidence that accused has committed another crime inde-
pendent of, and unconnected with, the one on trial is inadmissible;
it is not competent to prove one crime by proving another.' -O This
rule is generally adhered to throughout the United States. In People
v. Formato,0 defendant was charged with gambling and conspiracy
to keep a gambling establishment. Evidence was introduced to show
that defendant had been convicted earlier on two different charges
of gambling. This evidence was held to have been improperly
admitted. Citing Wigmore the court reasoned:"
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal- whether
judge or jury- is to give excessive weight to the vicious record
of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly
on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a con-
demnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge.
7 Brief for Plaintiff in Error, p. 26, State v. Eggers, 175 Neb. 79, 120 N.W.2d
541 (1963): "To have challenged each juror for cause as they were
called to the jury box at the time of impanelling the jury, would have
mitigated against the defendant in his attempt to defend himself on
other issues raised by this brief."
s Turpit v. State, 154 Neb. 385, 390, 48 N.W.2d 83, 87 (1951), quoting 22A
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 682 (1961).
9 See Brown v. State, 224 Miss. 498, 80 So. 2d 761 (1955), to the effect that
in an insufficient fund check case the fact that the defendant had
previously been convicted on a similar charge was inadmissible in the
second case.
10 286 App. Div. 357, 143 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1955).
11 Id. at 364, 143 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
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If evidence of prior convictions can not properly be introduced
at subsequent trials of a defendant because it improperly tends to
cast doubt upon his character, it logically follows that evidence
of an acquittal should also be excluded for the same reason. The
prosecution would rarely attempt to introduce such evidence. Under
the holding of Eggers, however, what could not be done directly
could happen indirectly. The jury would be aware of the previous
offense, either because many of the prospective jurors knew of the
first trial, or because the proceedings of the first trial would have
to be covered extensively by defense counsel in his attempt to
establish cause for challenges.
It is no answer to the problem to say that the challenges for
cause would have been sustained by the trial court, and that Eggers
would have obtained a new jury panel after all, since nearly all
of the members of the old panel would have been excused, leaving
too few to form a jury. Defense counsel had reason to believe that
this possibility was very remote since the trial judge had shown
little sympathy for appellant's contentions when he ruled unfavor-
ably on them in two pretrial motions. Should defense counsel be
forced to gamble with defendant's liberty by having to rely upon
the uncertain results of the challenges for cause?
In addition to the above problem, the challenges for cause of
each and every member of the jury panel would be time consuming
and repetitive. As Judge Yeager said in Bufford v. State:12 "We
no longer adhere to the rule requiring repeated objection to evi-
dence of the same kind. Should we be more technical when lives
and liberties are involved than in the determination of personal or
property rights? I don't think so."
These consequences, flowing from the holding in Eggers, demon-
strate the need for some method for challenging a jury panel as a
whole where there is evidence that the entire panel may be biased.
Ii.
ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO COUNSEL
The original counsel in Eggers tried to answer the problem by
filing a motion to quash and abate.13 This motion was not proper
12 148 Neb. 38, 46, 26 N.W.2d 383, 388 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
13 "A plea in abatement may be made when there is a defect in the record
which is shown by facts extrinsic thereto." NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 29-1809
(Reissue 1956). See Whitner v. State, 46 Neb. 144, 64 N.W. 704 (1895).
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to raise the challenge to the jury. As the Eggers opinion stated: 14
A motion to quash may be made in all cases where there is a
defect apparent upon the face of the record, including defects in
the form of the indictment or in the manner in which an offense is
charged. Defendant's motion does not involve any defect apparent
upon the face of the record. Furthermore, the motion does not ask
that the jury panel be discharged and another summoned, but asks
that the information be quashed and the prosecution against him
abated.
When the original attorney was forced to leave the pending
second case, Eggers second attorney attempted to raise the jury
issue, by filing a motion for a continuance. The court held this
motion to be improper, citing Seaton v. State,15 where the court
devoted very little space to the question of whether objections to
jurors could be made by a motion for a continuance. The court
concluded that they could not, citing only one case, Humphries v.
State 6. This might lead one to believe that the question is settled
in favor of the position taken by the Nebraska court. Such is not
the case. A great number of cases do say that one cannot question
the qualifications of jurors by a motion for a continuance.17 There
are, however, a number of cases supporting the position of ap-
pellant in Eggers.
For example, in Brown v. City of Tuscaloosa' the defendant
had been tried by a jury for a violation of a liquor-prohibition
ordinance of the City of Tuscaloosa and had been granted a directed
verdict after presentation of all of the evidence. The jury which
tried the case resulting in the appeal was drawn from the same jury
panel which had heard the evidence in the earlier case. The chal-
lenge to the jury panel, raised by asking for a continuance, was held
to have been properly made. The court said, however, that it is with-
in the discretion of the trial court to grant or deny the motion, and
such discretion was not subject to review upon appeal unless shown
to have been grossly abused.
In Young v. Commonwealth,19 a case analogous to Eggers, de-
14State v. Eggers, 175 Neb. 79, 85, 120 N.W.2d 541, 546 (1963), quoting
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1808 (Reissue 1956).
15 Seaton v. State, 106 Neb. 833, 184 N.W.890 (1921).
16 100 Ga. 260, 28 S.E. 25 (1897).
17 See Commonwealth v. Niemi, 365 Pa. 105, 73 A.2d 713 (1950); Wagner v.
Commonwealth, 179 Va. 387, 18 S.E.2d 888 (1942); Sanders v. State, 22
Ala. App. 358, 116 So. 329 (1928).
18 12 Ala. App. 617, 67 So. 780 (1914).
19 286 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. App. 1955).
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fendant was convicted at a jury trial. Six days later he was tried
for a crime totally unrelated to that charged at the first trial. The
jury for the second trial was drawn from the same panel from which
the jurors had been drawn for the first trial, and six of the jurors
sat at both trials. The court said, "We are of the opinion that on a
motion for a continuance this objection to the jury may be con-
sidered by the trial court, but whether or not a continuance shall
be granted on this ground lies within the court's discretion. '20
Thus, there is authority supporting the conclusion that a motion
for a continuance is the proper motion to raise the question of the
qualification of the panel, and the Nebraska Supreme Court would
have been justified in so holding. Such a ruling would have solved
the dilemma faced by Eggers' counsel and would have afforded
Eggers a trial by a jury from a new panel which would have been
above suspicion of bias.
There are several other methods for challenging jury panels2'
20 See also Dorsey v. State, 36 Ala. App. 376, 56 So. 2d 390 (1952); State
v. Wyckoff, 27 N.J. Super. 322, 99 A.2d 365 (App. Div. 1953); Com-
monwealth v. Krolak, 164 Pa. Super. 288, 64 A.2d 522 (1949).
21 Other methods which might have been used were:
(1) Challenge to the Array-There is a method for challenging the entirejury panel, known as a challenge to the array, which was not used by
either counsel in Eggers. In Gardiner v. State, 55 N.J.L. 17, 18, 26 Atl.
30, 31 (Sup. Ct. 1892), the challenge to the array is explained in this
manner: "A challenge to the array is an exception to the whole body
of jurors upon the panel summoned and returned for service at the term,
and is grounded upon some default of the sheriff or other officer making
the return in drawing or returning the jurors, or for partiality or
misconduct in performing the duties." A challenge to the array would
have been inappropriate in Eggers since there was no irregularity in
summoning the jury panel. The bias of the panel resulted not from the
way in which they were summoned but rather from their service at
appallant's first trial after the summoning of the panel was completed.
(2) Change of Venue-Nor did the attorneys in Eggers seek a change of
venue. The Nebraska statute governing change of venue in criminal
cases is NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1301 (Reissue 1956) which states: "All
criminal cases shall be tried in the county where the offense was com-
mitted unless it shall apear to the court by affidavits that a fair and
impartial trial cannot be had therein; in which case the court may direct
the person accused to be tried in some adjoining county." The word-
ing of the statute is probably broad enough to cover the Eggers prob-
lem. The cases applying the statute, however, have construed it nar-
rowly. A change of venue has been granted only when there is a
showing of general bias throughout the whole community. In light
of these cases, the change of venue alternative does not appear too
promising.
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which neither counsel in Eggers chose to employ. However, they
probably would have been inappropriate in the Eggers case.
Allowing the question of the possible bias of a panel to be raised
by a motion for a continuance seems to be the most suitable solution.
This procedure is not entirely satisfactory, however, because the
granting or denying of this motion lies within the discretion of the
trial court, and leaves the trial court's ruling not subject to review
upon appeal unless it can be shown that the trial court grossly
abused its discretion.
Appellate courts generally tend to uphold the determination
of the trial court unless evidence of abuse of discretion is very
persuasive.
The ideal solution seems to involve legislative action rather
than an extension of existing concepts by the courts. The legislature
could enact a statute allowing a challenge of the entire panel to be
made by a new type of motion similar to the challenge to the
array.22 A presumption of bias should be included in the legislation
to cover the situation which developed in Egger. 23
II.
WERE THE JURORS BIASED?
In the past, most courts have said the fact that a juror sat at a
previous trial of a defendant involving a totally unrelated offense
does not prejudice him to the extent that he should not be permitted
to sit at the second trial. One of the earliest cases discussing this
problem was Commonwealth v. Hill.24 Hill was placed on trial for
keeping and maintaining a nuisance. Over his objection, he was tried
before a jury which had earlier convicted him for keeping and
maintaining the same building as a nuisance. The court, refusing
to reverse his conviction, said: 25
It cannot ... be assumed that the jurors who had served during
the first trial of the defendant, had in any degree prejudiced the
present case, or were under any bias or want of impartiality which
would prevent them from giving a fair hearing to the new case
which they were called on to try and determine. It would certainly
be going very far to say that mere knowledge by a juror that a
22 See note 21 supra.
23 See discussion at note 30 infra. Note the use of the term "implied bias"
in the Kentucky statute.
24 86 Mass. 591 (1862).
25 Id. at 592.
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person had been found guilty of a previous crime, coupled with a
knowledge of the facts on which such conviction was founded,
would of itself operate to disqualify such juror from an impartial
and unprejudiced judgment of a new and distinct charge against
the same person .. . It is doubtless true that the defendant might
suffer in some degree from the moral effect produced on the minds
of jurors by the knowledge he had been previously found guilty of
a similar offense. But in this respect he would stand in a similar
position with one charged with an offence [sic], whose character in
the vicinage from which the jury was drawn, for honesty or correct
deportment, was generally known to be bad. Exact and absolute
impartiality is not to be had. The utmost that can be obtained is,
that jurors should be as impartial as the lot of humanity will
permit.
This reasoning seems to assume the ability of members of
society to judge one whom they know has already committed one
crime with complete impartiality. The judge in Hill conceded that
some prejudice to the defendant resulted, but he concluded that it
was impossible to eliminate. Admittedly, absolute impartiality is
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain, yet it would seem the im-
portant goal of avoiding substantial bias would be better served by
excluding those jurors known to possess prejudicial knowledge.
Contrast the approach of the judge writing the Hill opinion in
1862 with the more recent analysis of Judge Carter of the California
Supreme Court, writing in 1949 in People v. Zatzke.26 Defendant
was charged with murdering Dyer who allegedly made improper
sexual advances toward him. Evidence was introduced over objec-
tion as to defendant's prior homosexual practices. On appeal, the
majority upheld the introduction of this evidence, on the grounds
that it fell within an exception to the general rule that evidence
of prior criminal acts may not be introduced at the trial of one
accused of an unrelated crime. Judge Carter, dissenting, stated: 27
stated: 27
The large majority of persons of average intelligence are untrained
in logical methods of thinking, and are therefore prone to draw
illogical and incorrect inferences, and conclusions without adequate
foundation. From such persons jurors are selected. They will very
naturally believe that a person is guilty of a crime with which he is
charged if it is proved to their satisfaction that he has committed a
similar offense, or any offense ....
The line of cases following the decision in Hill seem to have em-
braced the principle laid down therein without re-examining the
2633 Cal. 2d 480, 486, 202 P.2d 1009, 1012 (1949).
27 People v. Zatzke, 33 Cal. 2d 480, 487, 202 P.2d 1009, 1012-13 (1949).
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assumptions advanced to support it. 28 A careful re-examination
ought to be made of the Hill case to see whether it is in accord with
the concept of the fair and impartial jury so important to our
judicial system.29
Various courts have questioned the wisdom of the rule. One
court had this to say about the problem, "While we do not think
that the practice of using the same jury to try an accused for dif-
ferent offenses is to be commended, we cannot say that it is error."30
In Bowling v. Commonwealth,31 the problem was discussed at
length. The defendant was convicted of grand larceny for the theft
of wheels and tires. Two days later he was brought to trial under
another indictment of grand larceny for the theft of other tires
and wheels. Seven members of the jury at the second trial had
also served on the first jury. On appeal of the second conviction
the majority held that since the Kentucky statute providing for
the challenge of jurors for implied bias did not include a provision
concerning jurors trying the same person at two trials on different
sets of facts, the conviction could not be set aside on this ground.
Three judges dissented on the constitutional ground that appellant
28 See, e.g., Stephens v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 551, 132 S.W.2d 878 (1939)
(very same jury at both trials, no reasoning given, rule simply stated);
Sandlin v. State, 19 Ala. App. 583, 99 So. 784, 785 (1924) (where the
court simply stated, 'There was no merit in this objection."); Sanders v.
State, 22 Ala. App. 358, 116 So. 329 (1928) (no reasons given, rule simply
stated).
29 The right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury has traditionally been
regarded as one of the keystones in our judicial system. In Booth v.
State, 67 Okla. Crim. 413, 94 P.2d 846 (1939), appellant was charged
with illegal possession of alcohol with the unlawful intent to sell the
same. After challenges by the state and by defense counsel had been
made, there were not enough jurors left to constitute a jury of twelve.
The court sent a deputy sheriff out to find some more prospective jurors.
Defense counsel objected to this since the deputy sheriff sent was
scheduled to testify against defendant at the trial. The court in reversing
the conviction, stated: 'To deprive him [defendant] of the legal
right to an unbiased and impartial finding on the evidence, which may
be in his favor, is to inflict upon him an injustice of the rankest kind.
... The framers of our Constitution, in which this right is so sedulously
guarded, well knew that a trial by jury afforded the best protection
for innocence and the surest mode of punishing guilt ever devised or
conceived by the mind of man."
30 Burford v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 512, 516, 110 S.E. 428, 429 (1922).
31286 S.W.2d 889 (Ky. 1955).
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had not been given a trial by a fair and impartial jury. Judge
Cammack, speaking for the dissenters, said: 32
One of the basic rules of evidence applied in our criminal pro-
ceedings is that evidence of prior convictions cannot be introduced
as evidence against the defendant in a case of this character, but
only for the purposes of impeachment if the defendant takes the
stand. The relevance of that rule to the instant case is not the
underlying theory that such evidence is irrelevant, but rather the
fact that, if such evidence is admitted, a reversal is necessary be-
cause the evidence is said to be substantially prejudicial to the
defendant. The rule is based upon the premise that knowledge of
the facts surrounding the previous crimes throws doubt upon the
impartiality required of our jurors. Yet, the opinion of the majority
would evade the effect of the rule by permitting the same jurors
to serve repeatedly in trials of the same defendant for separate
crimes.
Judge Cammack went on to say that the time element was very
important. The closer the two trials were to each other the greater
the implication of bais would be.
Shortly after the decision in Bowling, the Kentucky statute was
specifically amended to include the provision that, if a juror had
previously sat at the trial of the defendant for a prior separate
offense such fact would give rise to a challenge for implied bias.33
Several other cases have held that jurors will not be allowed to
serve in this manner, especially where, as in Eggers, the two
32 Id. at 892.
83 Ky. Cimw. CODE § 210 (1962) provides: "A challenge for implied bias
may be made: (1) If a juror be related by consanguinity, or affinity,
or stand in the relation of guardian and ward, attorney and client,
master and servant, landlord and tenant, employer and employed on
wages, or be a member of the family of the defendant, or of a person
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the
prosecution was instituted. (2) If he be adverse to the defendant in a
civil suit, or have complained against or been accused by him in a
criminal prosecution. (3) If he have served on the grand jury which
found the indictment, or a coroner's jury which inquired into the death
of the party, whose death is the subject of the indictment. (4) If he
have served on a trial jury, which has tried another person for the
offense charged in the indictment. (5) If he have been one of a formerjury sworn to try the same indictment, and whose verdict was set aside,
or who were discharged without a verdict. (6) If he have served as ajuror in a civil action brought against the defendant for the act charged
in the indictment. (7) When the offense is punishable with death, if he
entertain such conscientious opinions as would preclude him from finding
the defendant guilty. (8) If he have served on a trial by jury which has
tried the defendant for another crime." (Emphasis added). Section 8
was added just after the decision in the Bowling case by Ky. ACTS C. 87(1956).
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offenses charged are similar and the two trials follow each other
in rapid succession. 34
IV
CONCLUSION
Although the courts have not yet discarded the old rule con-
cerning the effect of prior jury service, it is hoped that the courts
will soon recognize an exception to the rule to cover fact situations
similar to Eggers. If the courts fail, perhaps a statute similar to the
Kentucky act should be enacted in Nebraska to solve the problem.35
As the court said in Eggers: 36
34In Weber v. State, 44 Okla. Crim. 447, 281 Pac. 987 (1929), a juror who
had served on a jury which had convicted defendant of possessing
intoxicating liquor was allowed to serve on the jury which tried de-
fendant for a separate offense of possessing intoxicating liquor. Counsel
had exhausted his three peremptory challenges to exclude three other
prospective jurors who had also sat at the earlier trial, and his challenge
for cause directed toward the juror in question was not allowed. The
two trials were only about a week apart and were heard during the
same jury term. The court held that the failure of the trial court to
sustain the challenge to the juror was reversible error. In Jean v.
State, 49 Okla. Crim. 412, 295 Pac. 233 (1931), there were four jurors
who had sat at the first trial and the two trials were only one day apart.
Once again the court held that failure to exclude the jurors was error.
Eleven jurors had served at the prior trial in Moffit v. State, 45 Okla.
Crim. 440, 283 Pac. 1027 (1930). The first and second trials were held
on the same day. Again it was held error to fail to allow challenges for
cause directed against five of these jurors after the first six had been
excused by peremptory challenges.
It should be noted that, in Weber, Jean, and Moffit, the two offenses
were closely related, involved some of the same questions of fact, and
required the testimony of some of the same witnesses. The courts have
said that jurors will not be allowed to serve at two successive trials
of a defendant where these factors are present, and this rule probably
influenced the appellate court in the above three cases to sustain the
challenges. But in these three cases the court also recognized the basic
problem of bias on the part of the jurors, irrespective of these three
factors, when two trials for similar offenses follow each other in rapid
succession and the jurors serve at both trials. These cases are quite
similar to the situation in Eggers, and the trend of these decisions should
not be ignored.
It should be noted that in these cases the impartiality of only a fewjurors, not the whole panel, was questioned. Therefore, utilization of
challenges for cause was adequate here but proved inadequate in Eggers
for the reasons previously mentioned.
35 See note 30 supra.
30 State v. Eggers, 175 Neb. 79, 86, 120 N.W.2d 541, 546 (1963) (Emphasis
added).
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It is the duty of a trial court to see that defendants in criminal
cases are tried by a jury such that not even the suspicion of bias
(leaning) or prejudice (prejudgement) can attach to any member
thereof. Unless the jury be absolutely impartial, the jury system
becomes an 'awkward instrument of justice', and the constitutional
guaranty that 'every person charged with an offense against the
laws of this state . .. shall have a public and speedy trial by an
impartial jury' is worthless.
Unfortunately, the results flowing from the holding in Eggers
do not measure up to the high standards the Nebraska Supreme
Court enunciated in the very same opinion.
Richard L. Schmelling '65
